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Abstract
We analyze a monopolist’s pricing and product reliability problem when consumers are entitled
to product replacement but have heterogeneous cost of exercising this right, and we assess the im-
plications of a decrease in consumers’ claiming cost on reliability, profit, and welfare. We find that
reducing consumers’ claiming cost may reduce reliability and increase profit. Additionally, the model
can explain why some firms encourage consumers to complain while others discourage consumers
from complaining. We also show that welfare and profit are partially aligned, specially when con-
sumers’ claiming cost are relatively low and the firm prefers to promote complaints; consequently,
we find that encouraging complaints will eventually increase welfare.
Keywords: product reliability, consumer complaints, liability cost, warranty.
JEL Classification: K41, D42, D21, L10.
1 Introduction
In their dealings with retailers and suppliers, regulations and warranties ensure that consumers can seek
a repair, a replacement, or a refund if the good they have purchased is faulty (Mann and Wissink, 1990).
The evidence, however, indicates that many consumers do not pursue any form of compensation (An-
dreasen and Best, 1977; Huppertz, 2007), suggesting that, for some consumers, claiming costs are high
(Huppertz, 2007; Hirschman, 1970). In the last decades, there have been several initiatives helping con-
sumers channel their complaints. At the same time, a firm may have incentives to reduce reliability when
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few consumers complain about faulty units. In this article, we analyze a monopolist’s pricing and product
reliability problem when consumers are entitled to product replacement and we assess the implications
of a decrease in consumers’ claiming cost. Our results suggest that product reliability may decrease
whereas firm’s profit and welfare may increase after a reduction of consumers’ claiming cost.
There are several facts reflecting that it is becoming easier for consumers to engage in claims when
receiving faulty units. First, consumer’s rights are constantly improving.1 Second, there are several
mechanisms that simplify complaints: small courts, class action lawsuits, public agencies (e.g., NHTSA
in the US) and consumer associations (claiming on consumer’s behalf). Third, information and commu-
nication technologies (ICT) provide new tools that simplify complaining and allow private enterprises
to help consumers channel their complaints.2 For instance, “getsatisfaction.com” in the US provides a
service to handle complaints and mediate between consumers and firms. Similarly, “miqueja.com” in
Spain publishes consumer’s complaints and firms’ responses, ranking firms according to the number of
complaints received and the responses that firms provide to them. Finally, it is also getting important for
firms to handle correctly consumer complaints: more than 40,000 firms use “getsatisfaction.com” in the
US.3
To study the effect of a reduction in the consumers’ claiming cost on the firm’s decisions, we construct
a model with a monopolist choosing the price and the reliability of the product it manufactures. The
product’s reliability is defined by the probability that it is not defective. Providing a more reliable product
and replacing a faulty unit are costly actions for the firm. Consumers derive a high utility from consuming
a product that does not break down and a low utility otherwise. If a product is faulty, the consumer
chooses whether to seek a replacement incurring a cost. Consumers differ in their claiming cost. Within
this set-up, our aim is to understand the impact of a decrease in consumers’ claiming cost (e.g., moving
downward the distribution of consumers’ claiming cost) on reliability, firm’s profit, and welfare.
Consumers anticipate the expected future cost associated with defective units when calculating their
willingness to pay. We define the demand effect as the effect of increasing reliability on consumers’
willingness to pay. The higher the consumers’ claiming cost, the lower the willingness to pay but the
higher the demand effect, as it is more costly for a consumer to request a replacement (when he does it)
and it is more likely that the consumer scraps defective units.
We first show that product’s reliability may decrease when consumers’ claiming cost decreases. Given
a consumers’ claiming cost, the firm’s choice of reliability faces the following trade-off: increasing
reliability is costly but increases the willingness to pay of consumers (demand effect) and decreases the
firm’s expected cost of replacements (labeled replacement effect). A reduction in consumers’ claiming
1In 1962, Kennedy’s Administration in the US introduced the first consumer’s rights: Safety, Choose, Be Informed, and
Be Heard. Another rights were included in 1985: Satisfaction of Basic Needs, Redress, Consumer Education, and Healthy
Environment. These rights spread fast to most countries. More rights are constantly improving consumer conditions.
2Car-related complaints at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) rose from dozens to thousands
when it incorporated the e-mail and the website platform to file complaints in 1995.
3Among these firms you find Procter and Gamble (Pampers), Microsoft, Panasonic, and Amazon. It is also worth noting
that most sales incorporates explicit and implicit warranties and firms usually stick to them.
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cost both increases the replacement effect and decreases the demand effect. We prove that there always
exists a reduction in consumers claiming cost where the reduction in the demand effect dominates, and
thus, reliability decreases. The situation where reliability decreases is more likely when consumers’
claiming cost is low enough.
Secondly, we show that firm’s profit may increase or decrease when consumers’ claiming cost de-
creases. When there is a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost, firm’s profit is also affected by two
opposite effects. Consumers’ willingness to pay increases but also consumers are more likely to request
replacements, increasing the expected costs associated with replacements. We prove that there always
exists a reduction in consumers claiming cost where the former effect dominates, and thus, markups and
profit increase. Otherwise, markups and profit decrease. The situation where profit increases is more
likely when consumers’ claiming cost is low enough.
We prove these results in two different setups. Our benchmark model analyzes the case in which each
consumer does not know his claiming cost before purchasing, that is, he knows his claiming cost only
after receiving a faulty unit. Then, we extend the model for the case in which each consumer privately
knows his claiming cost before deciding whether to purchase the product or not, and we allow for price
discrimination. A contribution of this extension –more technical– is to provide one example where a
bunching strategy for price discrimination arises due to an (endogenous) discontinuity in the Virtual
Surplus under regular conditions (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Lewis and Sappington, 1989; Rochet and
Choné, 1998; Jullien, 2000).
Finally, under mild assumptions over consumers’ claiming cost distributions, we show that firm’s
profit and social welfare are aligned. We find that if consumers’ claiming cost is low enough, a further
reduction in it will likely increase profit and welfare and reduce product’s reliability. This result is more
general for the benchmark case.
The anecdotal evidence reveals that, indeed, both firms and third parties (consumer agencies, etc.)
can partially affect consumer complaints, a possibility that we rule out in the model. To link this evi-
dence with our model, we show that, if a firm were allowed to make an exogenous and local change in
consumers’ claiming cost, it will prefer to discourage consumers from complaining only if consumers’
claiming cost is high enough; otherwise it will prefer to encourage consumers to complain. Consis-
tent with our implications, interventions that successfully reduced consumers’ claiming cost have been
first proposed by legislators and consumer agencies –like the US experience from the 1960s onwards–
supported mainly by consumer movements. More recently, many firms have found worthy to simplify
complaints even further, for instance, channeling complaints through private on-line initiatives. More-
over, our results suggest that these firms’ interventions may increase social welfare even when they may
be reducing their products’ reliability.
Our results are robust to different specifications: 1) if the firm replaces defective units with probability
lower than 1 when requested; 2) if product reliability is a function of expenditures in product design,
keeping constant the manufacturing cost; 3) if there is heterogeneity in consumers’ claiming cost and/or
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in consumer’s valuations; and 4) if there is correlation between consumers’ claiming cost and consumer’s
valuations.
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature. In Section 3 we introduce
the model. In Section 4 we analyze the case in which each consumer does not know his claiming cost
before purchasing. In Section 5 we extend for the case in which each consumer knows his claiming
cost before deciding whether to purchase the product or not. In Section 6 we describe different possible
specifications of the model. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our article relates to two strands of the literature. First, the literature on product liability. When con-
sumers perfectly observe product reliability, a change in product’s liability from consumer to producer
can affect quality negatively (Oi, 1973). Under firm’s liability, there may exists a non-monotonic relation
between (the degree of) product liability and the ex-ante investment to improve reliability when the firm
may take preventive ex-post solutions, e.g., recalls, (Chen and Hua, 2012). However, these approaches
assume that it is costless for consumers to complain when the product fails. Indeed, Simon (1981) recog-
nizes that costly litigation motivates the existence of negligent firms when there is imperfect information
about product reliability and the outcome of a lawsuit. In her environment, a reduction in consumers’
litigation cost always promotes firms to increase product reliability. However, that approach binds con-
sumers to buy one unit of the product, eliminating the demand effect which drives our non-monotonic
result.4 Hua (2011) also introduces a cost for consumers to recall a defective product when analyzing the
firm’s incentives to make a recall under alternative liability settings. However, he assumes that quality is
exogenous and consumers have already purchased the product.
Our article also relates to the vast literature on warranties as an exploitation device.5 To cite just a few
articles, Mann and Wissink (1990), Matthews and Moore (1987), Murthy and Djamaludin (2002), Huang,
Liu, and Murthy (2007) analyze how warranties may affect the firm’s choice of product reliability and the
demand. Again, these articles assume that it is costless to exercise a warranty or a consumer right.6 An
exception is Palfrey and Romer (1983) that study the relation between the optimal warranty and buyer-
seller disputes. However, they assume that consumers are homogeneous and that product reliability is
exogenous.7,8
4In Shavell (2007) there are other important aspects of product liability for accidents.
5Emons (1989) classifies the literature on warranties according to its purpose in exploitation, to increase consumers’ will-
ingness to pay, signaling, to reveal product reliability, and incentive, to increase quality conditions. See also Priest (1981) for
an investment approach.
6Most results that link warranty conditions and product reliability (including those results on the signaling approach of
warranties) relies on the fact that consumers exercise their guarantees and that consumers’ claiming cost is almost null.
7There are other mechanisms to motivate a provision of reliability based on repeated purchases, reputation, cooperation
and brand name (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994). In our static environment, however, these
mechanisms play no role in guaranteeing the provision of product reliability.
8Our article also relates to the literature on consumers’ complaint behavior (CCB), which focuses on the consumers’ reaction
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3 Model
There is a unit mass of consumers who makes two sequential decisions; first, whether to purchase one
unit of the product with price p and reliability rate x, and, second, whether to pursue a replacement if the
product breaks down.9 A consumer derives utility v > 0 from consuming one unit of a non-faulty good.
If the good is faulty or the consumer chooses not to purchase it, he derives a utility of 0. If the consumer
requests a replacement, he incurs in a claiming cost k ∈ [0,+∞) that comes from cumulative distribution
F . Heterogeneity in k may lead to some consumers scrapping faulty products.
On the supply side, a monopolist chooses its product’s price p and reliability rate x ∈ [0,1] to maxi-
mize its profit, anticipating that consumers may request a replacement if the product they have purchased
is faulty. The firm grants all replacement requests (there is binding legislation) by exchanging faulty
products for new ones. For simplicity, replacement units always work well.10 Let c(x) be the uni-
tary cost of the product with reliability rate x ∈ [0,1]. We assume c(x) > 0, c′(x) > 0, c′′(x) > 0, and
limx→1 c(x) = +∞. We also assume that (1− x)c(x) is weakly decreasing in x, i.e., the expected cost of
manufacturing replacement units is decreasing in the reliability rate.11
We first consider the case where k is uncertain for both the firm and the consumer. They both know
F , but k realizes only if the product is faulty.12 In a second case, we assume that each consumer privately
knows his claiming cost k before purchasing and that there are heterogeneous consumers distributed ac-
cording to F . We follow a mechanism design approach allowing the firm to screen consumers according
to their claiming cost k.
Throughout the analysis we assume that F and its changes for comparative static analysis are exoge-
nous. This exogeneity means that we don’t allow the firm to explicitly modify F . This simplification
does not prevent us from identifying firm’s incentives to modify F , and we discuss it in Section 4.3.13
4 Ex-Ante Uncertainty about Claiming Cost k
Assume that each consumer does not know his claiming cost k when deciding whether to purchase
the product but he does know the cumulative distribution F . Then, all consumers behave alike before
to dissatisfaction (Chebat, Davidow, and Codjovi, 2005; Owens and Hausknecht, 1999).
9As in Chen and Hua (2012), we assume that consumers observe the real value of x. Our results, as in their article, can still
be valid when the choice of x is private information. Suppose, for example, that the firm privately chooses x but can disclose its
value. As long as disclosure costs are small results holds: the firm prefers to disclose its reliability rate in order to avoid being
perceived as the lowest quality type. For example, consumer’s visual inspection can disclose x.
10Results remain if a replacement itself may fail as well, in which case the consumer may again request a replacement.
11These assumptions satisfy technical specifications according to Huang, Liu, and Murthy (2007). The family of functions
c(x) = β
(1−x)α , with α ∈ (0,1] and β ∈ R++, satisfies these assumptions.
12We can derived the same results in a market with perfect competition. Under perfect competition, firm’s problem is replaced
by choosing the price p and the reliability rate x that maximize consumers’ surplus subject to zero profit.
13The firm’s trade-off of changing consumers’ claiming cost can be introduced incorporating a cost of modifying F (up or
downward). This modification requires additional structure generating similar results.
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knowing their claiming cost k. A consumer anticipates that replacing a defective unit is worthy if v−k≥
0. Hence, with probability F(v) his claiming cost k is lower than v and, in expectation, he recovers utility
v−E[k |k ≤ v]. The ex-ante expected utility of buying EUB can be written as





∣∣k ≤ v])− p. (1)
The consumer pays a price p in exchange of a unit of the product which works well with probability x,
enjoying a utility of v, and breaks down with probability 1− x, requesting a replacement only if k ≤ v.
The consumer purchases the product if EUB(p,x)≥ 0.
We define the demand effect as the effect of increasing reliability on consumer’s willingness to pay













0 F(k)dk represents the net expected benefit of replacing a defective unit. The demand effect is
positive as
∫ v
0 F(k)dk ranges within [0,v]. The higher the
∫ v
0 F(k)dk, the lower the demand effect but the
higher the consumer’s willingness to pay.
The firm’s expected cost of selling one unit of the product is c(x)+(1−x)F(v)c(x): the manufactur-
ing cost c(x) plus the costs associated with a replacement c(x) when the product fails and the consumer
requests a replacement, i.e., (1− x)F(v).14 For a given price p and reliability rate x the firm’s profit of
selling is
Π(p,x) = p− c(x)− (1− x)F(v)c(x). (3)
We define the replacement effect as the effect of increasing reliability on the expected cost associated
with replacements, that is
∂
∂x





The replacement effect is negative, as we assume that (1− x)c(x) decreases in x. The higher the F(v),
the higher the replacement effect and the expected unitary cost.
For a non-trivial case, we assume that maxx xv− c(x) > 0. The problem of the firm is to maximize
Π(p,x) subject to EUB ≥ 0. From the participation constraint, the price is given by p = xv + (1−
x)
∫ v
0 F(k)dk. To determine the reliability rate we replace this price in the profit function and we derive
14Alternatively, the firm may also incur in a per-unit replacement cost cr accounting for a variety of costs; from adminis-
trative/shipping and handling costs to reputational losses. Additionally, there may exist reputational costs when a product is
defective independently of whether there is a replacement. Our results hold as long as cr is not too high.
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The left hand side is the marginal cost of providing reliability. The right hand side shows the positive
effects of providing reliability: increasing the willingness to pay through the demand effect and reducing
the expected cost of replacement units through the replacement effect.
4.1 Comparative Static
In this section we focus on the comparative static of a change in F on product’s reliability and firm’s
profit. We use the first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) as a criteria for a reduction in consumers’
claiming cost, that we denote by 1. Given Fn, Fm represents a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost if
Fn 1 Fm; that is, Fm(k)≥ Fn(k) for all k, with strict inequality for some k. Notice that if Fn 1 Fm, then∫ k0
0 Fm(k)dk ≥
∫ k0
0 Fn(k)dk for all k0.
Now, we can place our main result. There always exists a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost
that generates a reduction in product’s reliability. A reduction in Fn generates both an increase in the
replacement effect as Fm(v) increases and a decrease in the demand effect as
∫ v
0 Fm(k)dk increases. The
result holds since for any distribution Fn there always exists a distribution Fm, with Fn 1 Fm, such that
the change in the demand effect overcomes the change in the replacement effect.
Proposition 1. Given Fn, there exists Fm, with Fn 1 Fm, such that x(m)< x(n).
Additionally, there always exists a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost that generates an increase in
firm’s profit. A reduction in Fn increases both consumers’ willingness to pay and firm’s unitary costs. For
any distribution Fn, there always exists a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost that increases consumers’
willingness to pay more than firm’s unitary cost.
Proposition 2. Given Fn, there exists Fm, with Fn 1 Fm, such that Π(m)> Π(n).
Given Propositions 1 and 2, Lemma 1 states a relation among these results. Any reduction in con-
sumers’ claiming cost that increases profit, it also decreases reliability.
Lemma 1. If a change from Fn to Fm generates that Π(m) > Π(n), then x(m) < x(n). If a change from
Fn to Fm generates that x(m)> x(n), then Π(m)< Π(n).
Our results would be more general if consumer’s complaining behavior would be efficient. A replace-
ment is efficient if and only if benefits are greater than costs, i.e., if v ≥ k+ c(x). If this was the case,
then any reduction in F would generate a reduction in product reliability and an increase in firm’s profit.
15The second order condition is satisfied if c(x) is sufficiently convex.
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However, consumers’ complaining behavior is not contractible (by law) and consumers cannot commit
to any complaining behavior.
In spite of this lack of commitment/contractability, we can obtain an additional result in the compar-
ative static analysis placing the following assumption over cumulative distributions Fn.16
Assumption 1 - En[k|k ≤ v] increases in Fn for any v.
Assumption 1 places a particular relation on how the number of claimants Fn(v) and the expected
benefit of requesting a replacement
∫ v
0 Fn(k)dk change when there is a reduction in consumers’ claiming
cost. When consumers’ claiming cost is likely to be high, a reduction in it affects Fn(v) relatively more
than
∫ v
0 Fn(k)dk. However, additional reductions in consumers’ claiming cost increase the impact on∫ v
0 Fn(k)dk relatively to the impact on Fn(v).
Assumption 1 guarantees our main results for a wide subset of distributions with monotonic impli-
cations. Specifically, there exists a subset of distributions Fn such that any reduction in consumers’
claiming cost generates a reduction in product’s reliability. Additionally, the comparative static analysis
is monotone on this subset.
Proposition 3. Given Assumption 1. There exists F0 such that given Fn, with F01 Fn, then any reduction
in Fn generates a decrease in product’s reliability.
Similarly, there exists a subset of distributions such that any reduction in consumers’ claiming cost
generates an increase in firm’s profit, and the comparative static analysis is monotone.
Proposition 4. Given Assumption 1. There exists F1 such that given Fn, with F11 Fn, then any reduction
in Fn generates an increase in firm’s profit (and social welfare).
We have no general results for distributions above cutoffs F0 and F1. However, it is likely that for
high consumers’ claiming cost, firm’s profit increases and product’s reliability decreases as consumers’
claiming cost increases. This is the case, for example, when consumers’ claiming cost follows an expo-
nential distribution, i.e., Fn(k) = 1− exp(−k/n) where E[k] = n; then product’s reliability is an inverted
U-shaped function of Fn and firm’s profit is a U-shaped function of Fn. These relations depend crucially
on the lack of consumers commitment/contractability about their claiming behavior.
4.2 Welfare
The surplus generated when a consumer buys the product is vx−c(x). If additionally this buyer requests
a replacement if the product is defective the surplus generated is vx−c(x)+(1−x)(v−k−c(x)). When
consumers with k ≤ v request a replacement the welfare generated is
W (x,k ≤ v) = xv− c(x)+(1− x)F(v)
(
v− c(x)−E[k|k ≤ v]
)
. (6)








decreases in n for any v.
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As this welfare coincides with firm’s profit at the equilibrium price, then social and private incentives
are perfectly aligned. Consequently, any reduction in consumers’ claiming cost that increases profit will
also increase welfare.
4.3 Some Remarks
We have provided a simple setup pointing out that a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost promotes
consumer complaints. This increase in complaints may result in either a reduction or an increase in
product reliability, firm’s profit, and social welfare. Assuming a positive relation between the condi-
tional expected cost of making complaints and consumers’ claiming cost (Assumption 1), we claim that
consecutive reductions in consumers’ claiming cost will, eventually, decrease product’s reliability but in-
crease profit and welfare. Consequently, we provide a positive answer to the first question and a negative
answer to the second question in the title of this article: we should not worry if a reduction in consumers’
claiming cost generates a reduction in product’s reliability when this effect is also welfare enhancing.
The anecdotal evidence reveals that a change in consumers’ claiming cost can take place either by
third parties (consumer agencies, governments, or private enterprises) or firms. We show that, depending
on the current Fn, the firm may have incentives to increase or decrease Fn. As profit and welfare are
aligned, the welfare analysis looks encouraging. If society drives down Fn through passing consumer’s
laws and/or promoting and simplifying complaints with new devices, then firms will likely find profitable
to cooperate with society by reducing consumers’ claiming cost even further.17 In terms of reliability,
the reduction in consumers’ claiming cost may motivate an increase in product reliability; however, after
consecutive reductions, it is more likely that reliability decreases.
Notice that our results are consistent with the anecdotal evidence. In the last decades, there have
been initiatives helping consumers to channel their complaints, generating an increment in the number
of complaints. Additionally, more recently, firms started to realize that they can benefit from simplifying
consumer complaints through an increase in consumers’ willingness to pay. In this line, firms may need
to look for commitment and credibility. One way of doing so is through outsourcing consumer requests
to on-line platforms, which have increased notoriously in the last decades.
5 Asymmetric Information about Claiming Cost k (Price Discrimination)
We assume now that each consumer privately knows his claiming cost k before deciding whether to
purchase or not and that there are heterogeneous consumers according to a known cumulative distribution
F . The cumulative distribution F is assumed to be differentiable, with log-concave density function f .
17Firms may also propose a mean-preserving spread of F . For example, if substituting the complaining system for an easier
procedure but which is available only through fidelity programs, a firm simplifies complaining to loyal consumers and entangles
it to non-loyal consumers.
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A consumer with claiming cost k pursues a replacement if v− k ≥ 0 when the product acquired is
faulty, where k defines the consumer’s type. Consequently, each type-k consumer purchases one unit of
the product at price p and reliability x if
EUB(p,x ;k) = xv+(1− x) max{v− k,0}− p≥ 0.
Notice that the EUB increases in x, decreases in k and satisfies the single crossing condition.
The firm maximizes her profit designing a set of menus defined by prices and reliabilities, anticipat-
ing consumers’ complaining behavior. As some consumers choose not to complain, the firm recognizes
claimants and non-claimants among consumers. All consumers with k > v are non-claimants. Consider-
ing the mechanism design approach, a menu {p(k),x(k)} for buyer of type k must satisfy the incentive
compatibility (IC) and the individual rationality (IR) constraints. As the expected utility of buying de-
creases with consumer’s type k, the Virtual Surplus may be negative for some consumers and the firm
may prefer to exclude these consumers from purchasing the product. Consequently, the firm also consid-
ers an exclusion condition (EX) for those consumers that will not purchase the product.




























subject to k ∈ argmax
k′
EUB(k, p(k′),x(k′)), (IC),
EUB(p(k),x(k),k)≥ 0, if IB(k) = 1, (IR),
EUB(p(k),x(k),k)≤ 0, if IB(k) = 0, (EX), (7)
where IB(k) takes the value of one if the consumer with claiming cost k buys the product with menu
{p(k),x(k)} and zero otherwise.
As pointed out in Section 4, consumers complaining behavior is not contractible (e.g., by law) and
consumers cannot commit to a particular behavior, generating a non-monotonic Virtual Surplus for the
firm. Consequently the firm may prefer to bunch some consumers. To see this, notice that if only efficient
replacements were requested by consumers, consumers’ willingness to pay and firm’s unitary costs would
be discontinuous at k = v− c(x), decreasing from vx+(1− x)c(x) to vx and from c(x)+ (1− x)c(x) to
c(x), respectively. As these discontinuities compensate each other, Surplus and Virtual Surplus would
be continuous. However, consumers’ replacement decisions are not contractible and each consumer
requests a replacement of a defective unit when k ≤ v. Consequently, consumers’ willingness to pay
is continuous in k but unitary cost, and thus Surplus and Virtual Surplus, are discontinuous at k = v.
Unitary cost decreases from c(x)+(1−x)c(x) to c(x) and Surplus increases from vx−c(x)−(1−x)c(x)
to vx− c(x).
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As in Mussa and Rosen (1978), Lewis and Sappington (1989), and Jullien (2000), the solution to
the firm’s Problem 7 is characterized by one of two possible strategies, one with bunching and full
participation and one without bunching but excluding some consumers from purchasing. We label the
former the bunching strategy and the latter the exclusion strategy. We have a difference with those
articles. In our model the bunching case arises endogenously due to consumers’ inefficient complaining
behavior, even when the problem satisfies regular conditions.18
Given our assumptions, we can generally apply the first order approach. When following an exclusion
strategy, the firm chooses a marginal consumer k (< v), that is IB(k) = 1 if k≤ k and IB(k) = 0 otherwise.
The IC constraints define prices and informational rents, p(k) = v− (1−x(k))k−
∫ k
k (1−x(t))dt−U(k).
Replacing these prices into the profit function and noticing that U(k) = 0 (no rents to the marginal buyer),





















The firm chooses reliability x(k) according to the Virtual Surplus of consumer k (depending on k+ F(k)f (k) ),
minimizing the informational rents. From the first order condition respect to x(k) we have
c′(x) = c(x)− c′(x)(1− x)+ k+ F(k)
f (k)
. (8)
The left hand side represents the marginal cost of providing reliability. The right hand side shows the
marginal benefits of providing reliability, as defined in Section 4.19 The first two terms on the right hand
side represent the reduction in replacement costs (replacement effect).The expression k+ F(k)f (k) represents
the virtual demand effect of consumer k; increasing reliability, the firm charges higher prices. The















When the firm follows a bunching strategy all consumers buy the product, i.e., IB(k) = 1 for all
k. The firm chooses a cutoff consumer k̃, bunching all consumers with k ≥ k̃.20 All consumers with
k < k̃ are screened and their prices are defined by the IC constraints, p(k) = v− (1− x(k))k−
∫ k̃
k (1−
x(t))dt−U(k̃). Notice that each of these consumers receives an additional informational rent equal to
U(k̃) = (1− x̃)(v− k̃) (the lowest screened type-k̃ utility), implying lower prices than under an exclusion
strategy. Bunched consumers, instead, receive the same menu with price p = x̃ v. The firm’s problem
18The regular conditions are monotone reverse hazard rate (guaranteed by log-concavity of F), single crossing condition, and
homogeneous reservation utility.
19Comparing with Equation 5, write Eq. 8 as c′(x) = v−
(







20All consumers with k ≥ v are trivially bunched. The bunching strategy characterizes those consumers with k ≤ v that are































c(x̃))+ [1−Fn(v)](x̃ v− c(x̃)).
The first and second terms represent the aggregate Virtual Surplus; the third term represents the surplus
from those bunched consumers who request replacements when the product is faulty; and the forth
term represents the surplus from those bunched consumes who never requests replacements. Notice that
the second term is the aggregate informational rents to avoid that consumers with k ∈ [0, k̃] choose the
menu of the bunched consumers. The firm chooses reliabilities x(k) of screened consumers according to











v− c′(x)(2− x)+ c(x)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸








The first two terms in Equation (9) incorporate the positive demand and replacement effects of providing
costly reliability, as in Equation (8). The third term is new and incorporates the weight of the additional
informational rents paid to the screened consumers. The firm increases product’s reliability in order
to reduce the additional aggregate informational rents defined by F(k̃)U(k̃) = F(k̃)(1− x̃)(v− k̃). The
firm defines the cutoff buyer k̃ by being indifferent between screening and pooling (bunching) this cutoff
buyer. Defining x̃ the bunching reliability rate and x̂ := x(k̃) the reliability rate of the cutoff consumer k̃







− c(x̃)− (1− x̃)c(x̃)− (1− x̂)(v− k̃) = v x̂− c(x̂)− (1− x̂)c(x̂).
Notice that this mark-up can be positive or negative.21
5.1 Comparative Static
We now use the reverse hazard rate ordering as a criteria for a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost,
that we denote by 2. Given Fn, Fm represents a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost if Fn 2 Fm, that
is if Fm(k)fm(k) ≥
Fn(k)
fn(k)
for all k, with strict inequality for some k. This ordering 2 is stronger that 1: if
Fn 2 Fm, then Fn 1 Fm.
The reverse hazard rate ordering of distributions guarantees that the firm follows an exclusion strategy
when consumers’ claiming cost is low enough and a bunching strategy when consumers claiming cost is
high enough. Additionally, firm’s profit increases as consumers claiming cost decreases when following
an exclusion strategy. Let ΠB be the profit when the firm follows a bunching strategy and ΠE be the
21If 1−F(v) is sufficiently high, the firm may prefer to follow a bunching strategy even when the mark-up of those consumers
with k ∈ [k̃,v] is negative.
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profit when the firm follows an exclusion strategy.
Proposition 5. There exists a cutoff distribution F2 such ΠE(Fn)≥ΠB(Fn) for any Fn such that F2 2 Fn,
and ΠB(Fn)> ΠE(Fn) for any Fn such that Fn 2 F2. Additionally, for any Fn such that F2 2 Fn, ΠE(Fn)
increases if Fn decreases.
We do not have general comparative static results for Fn above the cutoff F2. We observe that under
some families of distributions, firm’s profit increases as consumers’ claiming cost increases when Fn
satisfies Fn 2 F2; that is, if consumers’ claiming cost is high, the firm prefers to increase consumers’
claiming cost to reduce the replacement effect. Notice, again, that this result is due to the consumers’
inefficient complaining behavior
Our main result about reliability extends in the following way: for any type-k consumer, the reliability
rate x(k) increases when Fn decreases, but the average reliability rate in the market eventually decreases.
That is, product reliability increases for any type k after a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost. How-
ever, since the distribution Fn has moved to the left, there are fewer consumers with type-k and more of
consumers with lower k who buy less reliable products; additionally, the marginal consumer k is smaller.
In the extreme case, where Fm(k = 0) = 1, the reliability rate xm(k = 0) is the lowest. Consequently, the
average reliability rate eventually decreases. The average reliability with Fn and the marginal consumer
k is defined as En[x(k)] := 1Fn(k)
∫ k
0 x(k)dFn(k).
Proposition 6. For any Fn, there exists Fm, with Fn 2 Fm, such that Em[x(k)]< En[x(k)].
For some particular distributions, like the exponential distribution, the average reliability has an in-
verted U-shaped with respect to Fn. When the firm follows a bunching strategy, the average reliability
increases as consumers’ claiming cost decreases; when the firm follows an exclusion strategy, the average
reliability decreases as consumers’ claiming cost decreases.
5.2 Welfare
The surplus generated when a consumer with claiming cost k buys a product with reliability x is vx−c(x).
If additionally this consumer requests a replacement the surplus generated is vx− c(x) + (1− x)(v−
c(x)− k).22
For the welfare analysis we point out the two elements of inefficiency: first, consumers may have
an inefficient complaining behavior; and second, firm’s asymmetric information problem generates an
additional distortion in the allocation of reliability and the exclusion of some consumers from purchasing.
Both of these inefficiencies are affected when consumers’ claiming cost decreases. However, when the
firm follows an exclusion strategy, firm’s profit and social welfare are partially aligned, and both increase
22We do not analyze the over or under provision of reliability, but in line with Spence (1975) and Lewis and Sappington
(1989) the firm has incentives to (almost always) overprovide reliability. Then, any reduction in consumers’ claiming cost that
reduces the overprovision may increase welfare.
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as consumers’ claiming cost decreases.
5.3 Remarks on the Price Discrimination Case
We see this extension of the model as a particular application of Johnson and Myatt (2006). Notice that
the bunching strategy resembles a massive-market strategy selling to all consumers and the exclusion
strategy resembles a niche-market strategy selling only to consumers with high willingness to pay. In
this setup, firm’s profit is convex in Fn. A change in Fn modifies demand generating a rotation of the
unitary markups distribution which motivates the firm to change from a bunching strategy to an exclusion
strategy. Particularly, a reduction in Fn not only motivates the change of strategy, but also provides
incentives to the firm to encourage consumer complaints.
Additionally, when the firm follows an exclusion strategy, profit and social welfare are partially
aligned, and they both increase when there is a reduction in consumers’ claiming cost. In general,
reducing consumers’ claiming cost may increase or decrease social welfare and profit, but additional
reductions in consumers’ claiming cost will motivate the firm to follow an exclusion strategy. Conse-
quently, social and private incentives will be partially aligned. Additionally, the firm will have incentives
to simplify consumer complaints even further in order to increase profit, and thus it will increase social
welfare as well. Moreover, these interventions may also reduce the average product reliability.
6 Robustness
Our results also hold under different specifications: when replacements are not always granted; when
reliability depends on ex-ante expenditures in product design; when consumers are heterogeneous in
their claiming costs and/or in their valuations; and when these dimensions are correlated.
We assume that replacements are always granted. Assuming that, when requested, a replacement
takes place with probability z < 1 does not change our results. Suppose that a firm can affect both
consumers’ claiming cost and the probability of replacement. Then if profit increases when reducing
consumers’ claiming cost it will also increase when increasing the probability of replacing defected
units.
We assume that it is more expensive to manufacture a more reliable product, i.e., c′(x)> 0. Our results
also hold if we assume that, instead, the firm invests in product design (e.g., R&D) to develop a more
reliable product whereas its manufacturing cost is constant for any reliability rate, e.g., an innovation
about how to assemble the product. A new effect arises: product design expenditures are a sunk cost,
thus the per unit sunk cost is lower when demand is higher. It is enough to assume that product design
expenditures are increasing and convex in product reliability for our results to hold.
In the model we assume that consumers’ valuations are the same across them. In the market, con-
sumers may be heterogeneous in their valuations and their claiming costs. These two dimensions may
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also be correlated. For instance, a consumer with higher income may have both higher valuation for a
product and higher opportunity cost of time (which is necessary to request a replacement). We consider
both cases: where valuations and claiming costs are heterogeneous but independent among consumers;
and where these two dimensions are perfectly correlated, i.e., the claiming cost is a fixed proportion of
consumer’s valuation, and our results still hold. The case with correlation seems a reasonably upper
bound for three reasons. First, the time to request is proportional to the total endowment of time for
consumers. Secondly, consumers with higher income can buy another individual’s time or a legal insur-
ance to handle with these complaints.23 Finally, note that wealth and education are positively correlated.
Well-educated individuals usually know better the legal procedure to make a complaint than less edu-
cated consumers, implying that these consumers may complain incurring in less time than consumers
with lower income.
7 Conclusion
This article studies how consumers’ claiming cost affects product’s reliability and firm’s profit. Under
general conditions we show that product’s reliability may decrease and firm’s profit may increase when
consumers’ claiming cost decreases.
The main warning of this article is about welfare implications. Promoting complaints may reduce
welfare and profit. Firms, however, on their own interest, will encourage even further consumer com-
plaints and eventually will increase welfare and profit. Then, we conclude that if any social effort is
allocated to help consumers it should be focused on encouraging consumer complaints. Afterwards,
firms will voluntary be in charge of simplifying these complaints even further.
Consumers’ associations goals are, among others, to help consumers voice their complaints and en-
force the provision of reliable products. In this article, we show that these goals may not be aligned:
the firm may decide to produce a less reliable product if more consumers request a replacement of a
defective product. This effect, however, should not worry consumer associations and consumer agencies
(public or private) as we showed that these effects are welfare improving.
Last, but not least, as it is getting easier to complain for consumers and many companies are turning
to encourage consumers to complain, the market may provide ideal situations to test our results.
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A Appendix: Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4
Propositions 1 and 2. We first notice that a change from Fn to Fm generates a decrease in product relia-









where x(n) is the firm’s choice of reliability when Fn; and it generates an increase in firm’s profit if and












which always holds and x(m) < x(n). Similarly, Condition (11) also
holds and Π(m)> Π(n).
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Propositions 3 and 4. We prove Proposition 3, the other follows the same logic. The profit function can
be expressed as Πn(x) = xv− c(x)+ (1− x)Fn(v)[v−En[k|k ≤ v]− c(x)]. There always exists F0 ∈ F
such that E0[k |k ≤ v] = v− c(x). A change from Fn to Fm with F0 1 Fn 1 Fm generates a reduction in
profit if
Fm(v)[v−Em[k|k ≤ v]− c(x)] > Fn(v)[v−En[k|k ≤ v]− c(x)], or
[Fm(v)−Fn(v)][v− c(x)] > Fm(v)Em[k|k ≤ v]−Fn(v)En[k|k ≤ v].
Since Em[k|k ≤ v] < En[k|k ≤ v], then the condition holds if [v− c(x)] > Em[k|k ≤ v]; and this last in-
equality holds by Assumption 1.
B Appendix: Proof of Propositions 5 and 6
Proposition 5. Notice that for any F the firm must choose between non-bunching, extracting surplus
from those consumers with low claiming cost, and bunching, extracting surplus from all consumers but
mainly from those consumers with k > v.
Under a bunching strategy, the firm find the highest markups from those consumers with k ∈ [0, k̃) and
with k ∈ [v,+∞) and the lowest markups from those consumers with k ∈ (k̃,v] which may be negative.
Any reduction in Fn increases the number of consumers with k ∈ [0, k̃] and with k ∈ (k̃,v]. Suppose
that the optimal firm’s strategy with the new distribution Fm is to bunch consumers, then necessarily the
firm also prefers the bunching strategy in the original distribution Fn.
Suppose not, that is, with Fn the firm follows a non-bunching strategy. This means that the mark-up
from those consumers with low k is so high that overcome the markups extracted from those consumers
with k ∈ [v,+∞). If this is the case, with Fm must follow a non-bunching strategy because there are more
consumers with low k and less consumers with high k.
If the firm follows a non-bunching strategy for a particular F , then the firm follows a non-bunching
strategy for any reduction in F . If the firm follows a bunching strategy for a particular F , then the firm
follows a bunching strategy for any increase in F .
Proposition 6. The proof is direct because the cumulative distribution Fm with lowest claiming costs,
that is Fm(k) = 1 ∀k ∈ [0,+∞), generates the lowest reliability rate.
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